TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/090390/0903015.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 12.2 KB | 256 lines

                                                                                THE GULF, Page 37

Sitzkrieg in the Sand


If he is smart, Saddam will hunker down and try to prove that
the best offense is a good defense

By BRUCE W. NELAN -- Reported by Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem, David
S. Jackson/Cairo and Bruce van Voorst/Washington


    He was dressed in a natty business suit, not a military
uniform. He smiled and tousled the hair of a young boy named
Stuart Lockwood, asking him what he had eaten for breakfast
(cornflakes and milk)  and marveling at how the lad fared better
than some Iraqi children. Talking cheerfully to a tense group
of British hostages, he presented himself as a benign and
misunderstood leader who had no choice but to act truculently.

    Taking a leaf from some outdated p.r. manual, Saddam Hussein
went on the airwaves last week in a miscalculated attempt to
revise his image and turn up the pressure on his enemies. He
should have known better. His crude hypocrisy of fondling
children may help convince the Iraqi masses that their
self-styled Knight of the Arab World is not such a bad guy. But
it was testimony to his isolation that he believed such a
transparent performance would move the West.

    Viewers could only stare in outraged fascination at Saddam's
staged-for-television meeting with the hostages at an
undisclosed location. In several rambling and convoluted
monologues, he offered kindly explanations of how they were not
human shields to be used in a war but a prevention against
danger. "Your presence here," he told the captives, "is meant
to avoid war. You are not hostages." For all the piety, he
occasionally lapsed into the malign, warning that Iraq would
"destroy any aggressor." After 45 minutes of playing Mr. Nice
Guy, Saddam departed with a wish that he could have stayed for
lunch.

    If Saddam had hoped his bizarre turn in front of the camera
would revise opinions in the West, he was quickly
disillusioned. The State Department called it "shameful
theatrics." British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said it was
"the most sickening thing I've seen for a long time."

    Two days later Saddam held an impromptu news conference in
Baghdad with journalists accompanying Austrian President Kurt
Waldheim, who secured the release of 80 Austrian hostages. The
foreign nationals he was holding, Saddam said, are "to prevent
attacks from happening." Saddam vowed to remain in Kuwait and
derided the kingdom's former rulers for "sitting around
gambling tables wasting millions." U.S. and Western
intervention in the gulf was "naked aggression," Saddam
charged, warning, "Whoever collides with Iraq will find columns
of dead bodies, which may have a beginning but not an end."

    These appearances prove that the clever dictator is working
all the angles to shore up his position. Baghdad has yet to
gain a major ally, and few cracks have fractured the
international consortium ranged against it. Iraq's economy and
morale are under siege, its pipelines closed, supply routes in
doubt and food supplies dwindling. The unattractive nature of
his options must be coming clear to Saddam.

    Yet he is not without strengths as he ponders what move to
make next. He still poses a potent military threat: he might
not win on the battlefield, but he could make the contest
bloody. Or he could ignite a conflagration so broad and so
intense it would burn everyone. Or he could simply fold his
tent, in the same pragmatic way he handed peace to Iran two
weeks ago, and retire to fight another day. But for now, his
best play is probably to sit tight.

    The military confrontation in the gulf seems to be
congealing into a 1990 version of the sitzkrieg. As Germany did
after blitzing Poland, Saddam is consolidating his position and
gazing across the frontier as his foes assemble their armies.
His 56-division, 1.5 million-man force -- last week he called
up his reserves -- is clearly on the defensive. In occupied
Kuwait his soldiers are digging in. Elite Republican Guard
units have been pulled back to join 15 divisions deployed to
protect Basra and Baghdad -- or perhaps Saddam himself.

    He must be disconcerted by the size and speed of the
American buildup, now bolstered by ships, planes and men from
22 other nations. The opportunity to attack is probably gone.
If he were to move, he would risk having his invasion force
destroyed by American air power, and he could be almost certain
that key military and economic targets in Iraq would be
demolished by strategic bombers.

    His best bet, analysts agree, is to try to wait out the
opposition: use his 20,000 hostages for maximum political
impact, probe for weaknesses, and leave the next move up to the
U.S. and its allies. All week long, Saddam has been testing the
other side's nerves. He has pushed hard at Western
determination to keep embassies in Kuwait open in the face of
harsh Iraqi threats. He is running his tankers through the
international armada, pressing to see if they will be forcibly
stopped. Both these gambits could easily set off a military
clash. At the same time, Saddam has issued almost daily
statements claiming he is open to negotiations without
preconditions. So far, no one has taken those very seriously,
but one day they might. "Time is now on Saddam's side," says
a senior Israeli intelligence officer. "The longer this
standoff drags on, the better his chances of survival."

    That is true up to a point. Saddam's hope, of course, is
that he can outlast the embargo decreed by the United Nations
and enforced by massed fleets. The odds have to be read against
him because Iraq does not have large stockpiles of food, 75%
of which it imports; its funds abroad are frozen; and he cannot
export his oil. But with tight rationing and scrimping, and
some leakage of supplies and spare parts, the country can
probably squeak through from several months to a year or more
of blockade without giving in to Western demands.

    A year is a long time in coalition politics. Saddam may be
betting that tensions and disagreements will develop between
European capitals and Washington, between the Western and Arab
states. International resolve could well weaken, or the Arab
man in the street might grow restive under the heavy foreign
presence. After a year in the desert of the Arabian Peninsula,
the huge army taking shape there is likely to be run down and
frustrated.

    Saddam may also be contemplating what Middle East experts
have dubbed the Samson scenario, lashing out in desperate
attempts to relieve the siege, even if his efforts pull him
down too. Some suggest he might invade Jordan in order to
provoke Israeli intervention and turn the struggle into an
Arab-Israeli war. Others believe he might launch air and
missile attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil fields, take millions of
barrels of oil out of production and create a world financial
crisis. And there is widespread worry that he might torture
or kill his hostages.

    While those are serious possibilities, they would carry
heavy prices. Pulling Israel, with the Middle East's best army
and air force, into a war would open a second front and speed
Saddam's military defeat. Executing hostages or attacking Saudi
oil fields would instantly bring massive bombardment down on
Iraq. "He would kill a lot of people," says the Brookings
Institution's Judith Kipper, "but Iraq would be devastated and
he'd be dead. He cannot believe he can win."

    Saddam is well aware that the U.S. would launch any
offensive with its air power, and he has kept his own 513-plane
air force at home. It would have to be swept from the sky
before American bombers could operate freely. Iraqi Mirages and
MiGs, armed with air-to-air missiles, would take their toll of
attacking U.S. F-15 and F-14 interceptors. Air-defense missiles
would probably down some B-52 and F-111 bombers. Thousands of
anti-aircraft guns ringing missile launchers, military bases
and nuclear and chemical plants would destroy some low-flying
F-16 and A-6 attack bombers. Once the shooting war began, the
U.S. would have to go all the way in order to liberate Kuwait
and eliminate Iraq as a threat, and that would ultimately
require a long and bloody attack on the ground.

    For all its strength, Iraq's military is not up to American
or European standards. Only about 20% of its troops have proved
themselves in combat, and only about 500 of its tanks are of
the most modern type. Its air force was timid in attacks on
Iran, and its military intelligence has nothing like the
satellite and electronic capabilities of the U.S. What Iraq is
good at is fighting defensively. And when the going got worse,
Saddam would probably fire his poison-gas weapons, much as he
did against Iran when defeat looked imminent. He would also
probably launch his missiles at Saudi oil installations. The
resulting destruction could unhinge the world's economy.

    Given those prospects, the West might decide instead to
negotiate. And Saddam could find that very appealing. "I don't
think the Iraqis are looking for it now," says a U.S. official.
"But what they might be after, as pressure begins to take
effect, is a solution that preserves as many gains as possible
from their conquest of Kuwait." Some experts, like Richard
Murphy, a senior fellow at the New York Council on Foreign
Relations, think that if such a point is reached, both sides
will acquiesce. "Money will be paid to an aggressor, or land,"
he says, in a deal arranged by Saddam's Arab neighbors. "We're
not going to devise it, we're not going to bless it. The
question is if we're going to tolerate it."

    In addition to the moral distaste, the West would also have
to swallow something worse: leaving Iraq with the army and the
nuclear potential that made it such a threat this time around.
Saddam could then celebrate his reputation as the Arab leader
who stood up to the U.S., and live to challenge the region
again.

    The logic of power aside, there is no certainty what choice
Saddam will make. British diplomats reported last week that
Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat had
held talks with Saddam in Baghdad. According to the report,
Arafat found Saddam nervous and often confused during their
discussions. He was particularly furious at the personal
attacks on him by Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.
This mood may account for Saddam's strange appearance on
television as the misunderstood statesman. If his judgment is
that poor, he may yet turn his country into a battlefield.


____________________________________________________________
WHAT HUSSEIN'S WEAPONS CAN DO


    Over the past ten years Iraq has amassed an arsenal of
mostly Soviet-made weapons, including these formidable items:

    LONG RANGE WEAPONS

Characteristics                    Purpose

AL HUSEEIN: a Scud B surface-to-   An inaccurate missile used
surface launcher with a range of   against densely populated
areas; more than 350 miles (550 km).       can be equipped with
chemical                                    warheads.

AL ABBAS: a Scud B still in        Same as Al Hussein, but with
a development, with a longer range   longer reach; both could
be used of 550 miles (900 km).             used against the
Saudi oilfields.

EXOCET: French air-to-surface      An accurate antiship missile
also missile launched by Mirage         effective against oil
tankers; fighters or attack helicopters      can hit ground
installations and for a combined range of more       can also
carry chemical warheads. than 450 miles (725 km).

    Iraq's 513 combat aircraft are a potent force but would
probably be outnumbered and outflown. Its air defense of 4,000
antiaircraft guns and more than 270 surface-to-air launchers
could exact a heavy toll.

    SHORT RANGE WEAPONS

Characteristics                  Purpose

ABABIL, surface-to-surface       Devastating against ground
troops, launcher with a range of         this system delivers
cluster bombs 60 miles (100 km).               that cover in
one salvo a larger                                  area than
a battery of howitzers.

    Iraq's 5,500 tanks and 3,000 pieces of artillery may be its
strongest asset and would inflict heavy casualties in any
ground fighting.